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Levin and Bean: The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public Confidence an

THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE: A
MATTER OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
Senator Carl Levin with assistancefrom Elise J. Bean*
The federal statute establishing a system for independent counsels,' addresses one of the most delicate tasks facing any government: the investigation of the government's own top officials when
they are suspected of criminal wrongdoing. As the statute's expiration date draws near 2 and the 100th Congress considers whether to
make the law a permanent part of the United States' criminal justice
system,3 this article reviews some of the historical, political and constitutional justifications for the independent counsel statute.
I.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE

The primary impetus for the independent counsel statute was
the Watergate scandal that engulfed the Nixon presidency. By 1973,
persons close to President Richard M. Nixon, including former Attorney General John Mitchell and former Chief of Staff Robert Haldeman, were suspected of having engaged in criminal conduct.4 The
press and public called for a thorough investigation of the bur* Senator Levin chairs the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management
which has legislative jurisdiction in the Senate over the independent counsel statute. He has
worked with the statute since its enactment in 1978. Ms. Bean is counsel to the Subcommittee.
1. Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824
(codified as amended, inter alia, at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
2. The independent counsel statute was enacted into law on October 26, 1978 with a five
year sunset provision. 28 U.S.C. § 598 (1982). It was reauthorized on January 3, 1983, again
with a five year sunset provision. 28 U.S.C. § 598 (1982). Subsequent to preparation of this
article, the statute was again reauthorized on December 15, 1987. Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 100 Stat. 1306 (1987)(to be codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 591-99).
3. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1987, S. REP. No. 123, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1987. H.R. 2939, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
4. See generally WATERGATE: SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT 4 (1975) [hereinafter REPORT] (describing the history of the Watergate special prosecutor).
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geoning scandal.
In response, Elliot Richardson, the attorney general who eventually followed Mr. Mitchell, issued regulations creating a new office
within the Department of Justice, the Office of Watergate Special
Prosecutor. 6 Reaching outside the Department's ranks, Mr. Richardson selected Archibald Cox to serve as the special prosecutor. 7 The
regulations provided Mr. Cox with independent authority to investigate the Watergate crimes and protected him from removal except
in the event of "extraordinary improprieties on his part."8
As part of his investigation, Mr. Cox initiated proceedings to
obtain certain tape recordings and documents in the possession of
President Nixon.' President Nixon ordered Mr. Cox to desist. 10
When Mr. Cox refused, on Saturday, October 20, 1973, President
Nixon ordered Attorney General Richardson to fire Mr. Cox.1" Mr.
Richardson resigned instead, as did the Deputy Attorney General
William D. Ruckelshaus.' 2 However, Solicitor General Robert H.
Bork obeyed the President's order and terminated Mr. Cox from his
post.1 3 The abrupt departure of Messrs. Cox, Richardson and Ruckelshaus from the Department of Justice was later described in the
press as the "Saturday Night Massacre." 4
Three days later, on October 23, 1973, Acting Attorney General
Bork abolished the Office of the Watergate Special Prosecutor. 5 He
instructed Mr. Cox's staff that the Criminal Division of the Justice
Department would assume control
over the Watergate
investigation. 6
The public outcry at these events was immense and justifiably
5. See generally A N.Y. TIMEs BOOK, THE WHITEHOUSE TRANSCRIPTS (1974).
6. 28 C.F.R. § 0.37 (1973).
7. Justice Department Internal Order 518-73 (May 31, 1973).
8. 28 C.F.R. § 0.37 (1973).
9. The subpoena issued to obtain these materials was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
10. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
II. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Broder, Nixon PoliticalClout Shrinks, Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1973, at
A12, col. 2.
15. Abolishment of Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,466
(1973) (made effective retroactively as of October 21, 1973). Mr. Bork may have acted illegally in firing Mr. Cox and rescinding the regulations. See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104

(D.D.C. 1973).
16.

See REPORT, supra note 4, at 10-11.
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so. Congress called for hearings 17 and introduced legislation 18 to authorize a court-appointed special prosecutor to replace Mr. Cox.
Acting Attorney General Bork faced skeptical questioning regarding
whether he would permit the criminal probe to continue without interference. In the meantime, President Nixon authorized Mr. Bork
to appoint a new special prosecutor, and he selected Leon Jaworski,
former assistant to Mr. Cox." Mr. Bork also issued regulations reestablishing the special prosecutor's office, three weeks after he had
abolished it.2 0 The new regulations restricted removal of the special
prosecutor to an even greater extent than before, essentially requiring prior notice to and approval by certain Congressional leaders.
Special prosecutor Jaworski resumed the effort to obtain the
tape recordings and documents, and President Nixon eventually surrendered them. Mr. Jaworski later initiated criminal proceedings and
obtained guilty pleas from Messrs. Mitchell, Haldeman and others.
President Nixon subsequently resigned under pressure. His successor, President Gerald Ford, granted him a pardon to preclude any
criminal prosecution.
These events profoundly shook the American public's confidence
in our government and our criminal justice system. The bitter legacy
of Watergate was a new level of public cynicism and distrust. The
public had learned that persons close to the President can commit
crimes, that a President may try to limit the activities of the prosecutor investigating these crimes, and that Justice Department officials may succumb when the President orders a disobedient prosecutor to be removed, notwithstanding regulations protecting that
prosecutor's independence. The result was and is a loss of public confidence in criminal investigations by the Department of Justice when
the subjects are persons close to the President.
Watergate encapsulated for the United States a problem which
potentially faces every government: how to maintain public confidence in the government's prosecutors and criminal justice system
17.

Extensive hearings were held during the following weeks by both Houses of Con-

gress. See, e.g., Special ProsecutorHearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Special Prosecutorand Watergate GrandJury Selection:Hearings on

H.R.J. Res. 784 & H.R. 10937 Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).

18. See, e.g., S. 2611, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 784, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
19.

See REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.

20. Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 30,738 (1973) (codified
at 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.37-0.38 (1974)).
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when those prosecutors are asked to investigate their own colleagues
and political leaders. The United States' solution was to enact the
Independent Counsel Statute.
II.

INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE

The independent counsel statute is part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,21 which is a direct response to many of the
problems associated with Watergate. It seeks to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity of the federal government by,
inter alia, establishing procedures for financial disclosure by public
officials, 22 imposing outside earnings and post-employment restrictions on government employees, 23 and creating a government-wide
office to monitor agency ethics programs. 24 Title VI of the Act establishes the system for "independent counsels" to investigate allegations of criminal wrongdoing by officials who are close to the President. 5 Its purpose is to ensure that these criminal proceedings are
conducted in a fair and impartial manner.
Reduced to its essentials, the statute has three mechanisms to
guarantee the independence of the independent counsels. First, a
court-not the President-selects the individuals who serve as independent counsels.26 Second, the scope of the independent counsels'
21.

Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2

U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). For a

detailed discussion of the history and evolution of the Ethics in Government Act see Note,
Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination of

the Practical,Constitutional,and Political Tensions in the Special ProsecutorProvisions of
the Ethics in Government Act, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 113, 118 & nn. 27-29 (1982).

22. 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-09 (1982) (financial disclosure requirements for legislative personnel); 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-09 (1982) (financial disclosure requirements for judicial personnel); 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 201-12 (1982) (financial disclosure requirements for executive
personnel).
23.
24.
25.
26.
the

18 U.S.C. §§ 202-09 (1982).
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 401-07 (1982).
See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C.§ 593(b) (1982), which provides in relevant part that:
division of the court shall appoint an appropriate independent counsel and shall

define the independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction. A[n] independent counsel's identity and prosecutorial jurisdiction should be made public upon request of
the Attorney General or upon a determination of the division of the court that disclosure of the identity and prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel
would be in the best interests of justice. In any event the identity and prosecutorial

jurisdiction of such prosecutor shall be made public when any indictment is returned
or any criminal information is filed.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol16/iss1/2

4

Levin and Bean: The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public Confidence an
1987]

INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE

inquiries is defined by the court27 and the conduct of their investigations is placed outside the direct control of the Department of Justice.2 Finally, independent counsels, unlike most other executive
branch officials, are removable from office only for good cause and
not at the President's will.29 Together, these mechanisms enable the
independent counsel to conduct activities with a measure of independence from the chief executive.
At the same time, the independent counsel is not without con-

straints. He or she may be appointed by the court only when the
attorney general determines in writing that an independent counsel
is needed.30 Moreover, he or she holds only a temporary post and
may be discharged by the attorney general for good cause.31 The
statute also requires the independent counsel to follow whenever possible the established law enforcement policies of the Department of
Justice.32 Further, as an officer of the court, the independent counsel,
27. Id.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1982), which provides in relevant part that:
a[n] independent counsel appointed under this chapter shall have, with respect to all
matters in such independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction ... full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutional functions of the
Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of
the Department of Justice ....
Id. Such investigations and prosecutional functions include for example, conducting proceedings before grand juries, participating in court proceedings and engaging in any civil or criminal litigation the independent counsel deems necessary, conducting appeals, and making applications to any federal court for a grant of immunity for a witness. Id.
In addition, whenever a matter is within the prosecutional jurisdiction of an independent
counsel, the Department of Justice and the Attorny General must suspend all investigations
and proceedings regarding that matter, unless the independent counsel requests assistance, or
agrees in writing that such an investigation may continue. 28 U.S.C. § 597(a) (1982).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1982). The statute explicitly authorizes the Attorney General to
discharge independent counsels. In the event of such a discharge, the Attorney General must
submit, to the court and to the Committees on the Judiciary of both the House and the Senate,
a report specifying factual findings and ultimate grounds for removal. These reports, as a
general matter, must be made public. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b) (1982). An independent counsel who
is removed from office has the right to obtain judicial review of the action and may be able to
obtain reinstatement or other appropriate relief. 28 U.S.C. § 596 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1982), which provides that:
If the Attorney General upon completion of the preliminary investigation, finds reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted, or
if ninety days elapses from the receipt of the information without a determination
by the Attorney General that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation or prosecution is warranted, then the Attorney General shall apply to
the division of the court for the appointment of a special prosecutor.
Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1982).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 594(0 (1982).
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like all federal prosecutors, is subject to judicial supervision.
This balancing of independence and accountability is the result
of lengthy deliberations by Congress. The independent counsel statute was enacted five years after the Saturday Night Massacre. Its
final form follows multiple proposals, bills, hearings and debate."
Congress concluded, correctly I believe, that public confidence
in the criminal justice system could be maintained if, in the rare
cases when persons close to the President are suspected of criminal
misconduct, criminal proceedings are conducted by temporary
outside counsels, who are appointed by an impartial body, removable
only for good cause, and possessing meaningful independence. Appointment, removal and direct control over the proceedings were the
key legislative considerations, and mechanisms in these three areas,
geared to protect the prosecutor's independence, form the foundation
of the independent counsel law.
The independent counsel system has now been in place for nine
years. To date, it has successfully handled cases involving our highest government officials and, on occasion, matters of great political
sensitivity. For example, when Edwin Meese, III, was nominated to
be attorney general and a variety of possible criminal allegations
were levelled against him, an independent counsel examined the allegations and declined prosecution, clearing the way for Mr. Meese's
confirmation.3" Currently, independent counsels are investigating, inter alia, allegedly improper influence peddling by Michael Deaver,3 5
former Chief of Staff to the President, and Franklyn Nofziger,36 former Assistant to the President, as well as allegations of obstruction
of justice, conspiracy to defraud and other criminal conduct by high
33. See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2059 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Special ProsecutorProvisions of Ethics in Government Act
of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest Matters: Hearings on S. 555
Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Watergate
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 495 and S. 2036 Before the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Nomination of Elliot L.
Richardson to be Attorney General: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). See supra note 17 for additional hearings on the independent

counsel statute held during 1973.
34. See. e.g., Werner, Senate Approves Meese to Become Attorney General, N.Y.

Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
35.
36.

In re Deaver, No. 86-2 (D.C. Cir. Independent Counsel Division).
In re Nofzinger, No. 87-1 (D.C. Cir. Independent Counsel Division).
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government officials associated with the Iran-Contra matter."
The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, through its Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, recently reviewed these and other activities under the independent counsel statute and determined the law to be an effective and valuable addition
to the United States Code. At a Committee hearing, the American
Bar Association testified that:
[T]he ABA is convinced that it is imperative for the administration
of justice and the continued public confidence in the fairness of our
system of justice that the Congress reauthorize the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act ....
[T]he
basic mechanism of the independent counsel law is soundly conceived and has functioned effectively since its passage in 1978 and
its re-enactment in 1982.38
Archibald Cox stated at the same hearing that the law is "essential
to preserving public confidence in the fair and ethical behavior of
public officials." 9 Of course, this favorable analysis of the law is not
universal. The Governmental Affairs Committee also heard from
critics.40 On the whole, however, the Committee found the criticisms
unpersuasive. In a report on S.1293, a bill to renew the independent
counsel statute, the Committee states plainly that the statute "has
served the country well" 41 and that it "provides an effective and essential procedure to investigate persons close to the President. 42
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: CHECKS AND BALANCES

Despite the apparent success of the independent counsel statute
in restoring public confidence in the criminal investigation of persons
close to the President, some commentators have questioned its consistency with the Constitution.43 I believe it comports wholeheartedly
37. In re Iran-Contra, No. 86-6 (D.C. Cir. Independent Cir. Counsel Division).
38. Oversight of the Independent Counsel Statute: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs,

100th Cong., 1st Sess. 215-16 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Hearings] (statement of Irvin B. Nathan, Chairman, Ad Hoc Comm. on the Independent Counsel Statute, American Bar

Association).
39. Id. at 186 (statement of Archibald Cox, Professor of Law, Harvard University).
40. See, e.g., id. at 20 (testimony of John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, arguing that the appointment, direction and control, and
removal provisions of the statute violate the principle of separation of powers).

41.

S.Rep. No. 123, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987).

42.

Id. at 8.

43. Prior to the enactment of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, initial constitutional
objections to the special prosecutor provisions concerned the impropriety of allowing judicial
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with our constitutional system of government by furthering the principle of checks and balances.
The Framers of the Constitution designed the federal government with a wary eye toward preventing any one person or branch
from attaining absolute authority. They created three branches of
government and assigned them separate yet intertwining responsibilities so that each would serve as a check against the others."" For
example, the legislature was given primary responsibility for enacting rules of law, but the executive was given the power to veto unwise statutes. The executive was given primary responsibility to enforce the laws, but the legislature was given the power to reject
nominees for top executive positions and to restrict enforcement activities through the power of the purse. The judiciary was given primary responsibility to apply the laws in specific cases and controversies, but the executive and legislature were given roles in the
selection and impeachment of judges.
As these intertwining responsibilities illustrate, "separation of
supervision and the removal of a special prosecutor. See Note, supra note 21, at 126 n.62.
When the 1978 Act was passed, however, these objections became moot. As enacted, though
the statute does provide for judicial appointment of a special prosecutor, it does not provide for
judicial supervision or removal. 28 U.S.C. §§ 593-96 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also Note,
supra note 21, at 126 n.62.

After the passage of the special prosecutor legislation, constitutional objections to the Act
focused on judicial appointment of the special prosecutor, and on restrictions on the President's
power to remove the special prosecutor. See, e.g., Special ProsecutorProvisions of the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Oversight of Governmental Management of the Comm. on Government Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-96 (1981)
(testimony of then Associate Attorney General Rudolph W. Giuliani). Specifically, Giuliani
stated that:
The courts have long and consistently recognized that the prosecutioh of a crime is a
core function of the executive branch of Government, and within the exclusive perogative of the Attorney General, and ultimately the President .... Such a scheme
which lodges these executive branch functions in an officer who is neither appointed
by, accountable to, nor save in extraordinary circumstances, removable by the . . .
President, is difficult to square with our doctrine of separation of powers ....The
act's restrictions on the President's Removal powers are also highly questionable.
Meyers v. United States articulated the basic proposition, unquestioned in any subsequent case, that the President has the constitutional power to remove at his pleasure any official exercising purely executive functions, and that a congressional infringement on the removal power with respect to such officials is constitutionally
impermissable.
Id, at 94.
44. In Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3186 (1986), the Supreme Court states that
"[the declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of government . . .was to
'diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty.'" (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). See generally Symposium: Bowsher v, Synar, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 421 (1987).
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powers" is not an end in itself. The separation of powers among the
branches is part of a larger constitutional principle favoring checks
and balances. The three branches are given separate powers so that
each serves as a check on the others. The ultimate goal is a constitutionally mandated balance of power among the principal actors in
government, so that none dominates and assumes disproportionate
control.
Critics of the independent counsel statute often charge that the
law undermines the principle of separation of powers.4" They argue
that the Constitution assigns the power to enforce the laws to the
executive branch, that criminal prosecutions are an inherent part of
that enforcement power, and that it is therefore unconstitutional to
assign prosecutorial responsibilities to an independent counsel, who is
not appointed by and removable at the will of the President. 46
This constitutional argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, since the Constitution mandates maintaining checks and balances among the branches of government, it makes sense that the
executive branch not exert absolute control over criminal prosecutions, particularly in the rare cases where its own top officials are
alleged to have committed serious crimes. In such rare circumstances, the other branches may participate to ensure a fair and impartial investigation, authorizing a counsel with some independence
from the chief executive to conduct the proceedings. Such participation by the other branches serves as a check against the extreme case
in which the executive branch might shield its top officials from prosecution, even where they deliberately flout the laws and judgments of
Congress and the courts, committing serious crimes.47
It is worth noting that, in creating the independent counsel system, Congress did not reserve a major role for itself or aggrandize
the legislature at the expense of the other branches of government.
For example, Congress does not decide when an independent counsel
45. See supra note 43.
46. Id.
47. Some critics of the independent counsel law argue that the Constitution already provides a remedy for this extreme case: impeachment of the offending officials by Congress. U.S.

CoN sT. art. II, § 4. The existence of the impeachment process does not mean, however, that
other ways of checking the executive branch's prosecutorial power to prevent abuse are consti-

tutionally prohibited. Moreover, impeachment is not a criminal proceeding and does not subject officials to prosecution; it only removes them from office. U.S. CON T. art. I, § 3, cl.7; see
also Kurland, Watergate, Impeachment, and the Constitution, 45 Miss. L.J. 531, 538 (1974).
Impeachment also does not apply to former officials, while the independent counsel law sub-

jects current and recent occupants of high government office to the same criminal justice system that applies to all other persons. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(1)-(8), (c) (1982).
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is needed; that decision is left to the executive branch.48 Congress
does not select the independent counsels or define their inquiries;
those decisions are placed within the province of the judiciary.4 9
Congress also plays no role in removing an independent counsel from
office. 50 In fact, the only statutory role given to Congress is an advisory one suggesting when an independent counsel should be appointed and, on occasion, questioning the actions of independent
counsels already in office." This is similar to the oversight role Congress currently has with respect to criminal proceedings handled by
the Department of Justice.
The role assigned to the judiciary is also a limited one, though
crucial to ensuring the integrity of the process. A special court,
whose members are selected by the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, is charged with appointing the persons who
serve as independent counsels and defining the scope of their inquiries. 52 By lodging this appointment power with a court of law, Congress relies directly on Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution
which states in pertinent part: "the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments."" a
Congress determined, correctly I believe, that the selection of
the person to serve as independent counsel is key to ensuring the
independence of the proceedings and is a decision which should be
54
made by an impartial yet knowledgeable body, such as a court.
Authorizing the court to describe the scope of the counsel's inquiry is
48. Under the independent counsel statute, when the attorney general receives sufficient
information to constitute grounds to investigate a person under the Act, he must first conduct
a preliminary investigation. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1) (1982). Upon completion of this preliminary investigation, if the attorney general determines that further investigation or prosecution
is warranted, he is directed to apply to the court for the appointment of an independent prosecutor. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1982).

49. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 595 (1982).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1982).
2.
53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
54. Courts have had considerable experience in appointing prosecutors, who then serve
as officers of the court and are subject to judicial supervision; indeed, the courts' authority to
make such appointments has been upheld. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 107 S.Ct. 2124 (1987) (holding that a court may appoint temporary counsel from
outside government to prosecute criminal contempt case); United States v. Solomon, 216 F.
Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that a statute may authorize a court to appoint a person
to serve as U.S. Attorney in the event a vacancy arises in that office).
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an inherent part of the appointment power, since the court appoints
the independent counsel to a temporary office, whose tenure must be
defined by the completion of a particular task. It is also an important
decision, since it defines the authority of the independent counsel to
investigate the alleged wrongdoing.
The court's power to appoint and define the inquiries of independent counsels is a minimal intrusion into the executive's law enforcement authority, especially when compared to the powers retained by the executive branch under the independent counsel law.
For example, only the attorney general can request appointment of
an independent counsel.5 5 The court cannot appoint one without such
a request, 56 and the attorney general's decision in this matter is final
and unreviewable by any court or legislative body.57 Thus, there can
be no independent counsel unless the executive branch determines
there is a need for one.
Another power at the department's disposal is its statutory right
to present in court its views on any legal dispute in an independent
counsel case.58 The department has used this authority successfully
to limit the scope and direction of independent counsel inquiries.5
The law also permits the Attorney General to remove any independent counsel from office, if good cause exists for discharge. Although
this authority is less than the power to terminate at will, it remains a
significant source of control over independent counsels who may
abuse their positions.60
The principle of separation of powers is part of the greater constitutional concern for checks and balances to insure that no one part
of the federal government assumes disproportionate power. The independent counsel law serves this end by creating checks and balances
among the branches in the rare instance when the executive branch
55. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1982).
56.

28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (1982).

57. 28 U.S.C. § 592(0 (1982).
58.

28 U.S.C. § 597(b) (1982).

59. See, e.g., Briefs filed by the Department of Justice, United States v. Deaver, No. 87096 Crim. (D.D.C. June 19, 1987) (successfully opposing enforcement of subpoena issued by

independent counsel directing Canadian diplomat to testify); In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)(successfully opposing independent counsel request to investigate persons whom the
Attorney General had previously determined should not be pursued).

60. The good cause removal standard in the independent counsel law, in fact, represents
less of a restriction on removal than the Justice Department accepted in regulations governing

the Watergate special prosecutor. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) with 28 C.F.R. § 0.37 (1973).
See also, Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3188 (1986) (stating that after appointment, an

official fears only the authority that can order removal).
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is asked to investigate and possibly prosecute its own top officials.
The law's limited intrusions into executive authority, consisting of a
court-appointed temporary counsel, removable for good cause but
with independent authority to investigate wrongdoing by persons
close to the President, are not only consistent with our constitutional
system of government, but also further the constitutional principle of
checks and balances.
III.

CONCLUSION

The independent counsel statute serves two purposes and serves
them well. It restores public confidence in our criminal justice system, severely shaken after the debacle of Watergate, and it furthers
the Framers' goal of instilling appropriate checks and balances
within the federal government. The statute merits a permanent place
in American law.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol16/iss1/2

12

